1. What are the statute of limitations for tort and contract actions as they relate to the transportation industry.

Pursuant to NRS 11.190, an action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be commenced within six (6) years. An action for a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing must be commenced within four (4) years.

An action to recover “damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must be commenced within two (2) years.

2. What effects, if any, has the COVID Pandemic had on tolling or extending the statute of limitation for filing a transportation suit and the number of jurors that are sat on a jury trial.

Because of the Covid Pandemic, statutes of limitations were tolled by the Governor’s Directive 009 (Revised). “Any specific time limit set by state statute or regulation for the commencement of any legal action is hereby tolled from the date of this Directive until 30 days from the date the state of emergency declared on March 12, 2020 is terminated.”

The Covid Pandemic has not altered the number of jurors seated for a civil jury trial.

3. Does your state recognize comparative negligence and if so, explain the law.

NRS § 41.141 provides that the comparative negligence of a plaintiff will bar recovery if his negligence was greater than the negligence of the defendant. NRS § 41.141 (1). A plaintiff cannot recover if he is determined to be more than 50 percent at fault for the accident. If a plaintiff’s comparative negligence is not greater than 50 percent, his damages will be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributed to him. NRS § 41.141(2)(b).

4. Does your state recognize joint tortfeasor liability and if so, explain the law.

If comparative negligence is asserted as a defense, the defendants are severally liable for the percentage of negligence attributable to them. If comparative negligence is not asserted as a defense, the defendants are jointly liable for any award.

“Where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.”  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.225.  A party who has paid more than his or her share of the common liability may seek contribution from the other jointly liable party or parties.  Id.  This right does not apply to a party who has entered a settlement with the claimant.  Id.

5. Are either insurers and/or insureds obligated to provide insurance limit information pre-suit and if so, what is required.

NRS 690B.024 provides that a claimant or any attorney representing the claimant “may provide to the party against whom a claim is asserted” for compensation or damages under a policy of motor vehicle insurance, “a written authorization to receive all medical reports, records, films and bills related to the claim.” If such written authorization is provided, the insurer shall disclose, within five (5) business days, “a copy of the declarations page of the policy of motor vehicle insurance.”

Once litigation commences, NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(v) requires the defendant to disclose “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnity or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment and any disclaimer or limitation of coverage or reservation of rights under any such insurance agreement.” This rule does require the disclosure of any applicable excess coverage.

6. Does your state have any monetary caps on compensatory, exemplary or punitive damages.

There are generally no limits on compensatory damages awards; however, an award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought against a political subdivision may not exceed $100,000. NRS § 41.035(1). Additionally, in medical malpractice actions, noneconomic damages shall not exceed $350,000, regardless of the number of plaintiffs, defendants, or theories of liability.  NRS § 41A.035; Tam v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 80, 358 P.3d 234 (2015).

Punitive damages are limited to three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded if the compensatory damages are $100,000 or more. NRS § 42.005(1)(a). If the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff are less than $100,000, punitive damages are then limited to $300,000. NRS § 42.005(1)(b). These limits do not apply to:  (a) a manufacturer, distributor or seller of a defective product; (b) an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage; (c) a person for violating a state or federal law prohibiting discriminatory housing practices; (d) a person for damages or an injury caused by the emission, disposal or spilling of a toxic, radioactive or hazardous material or waste; or (e) a person for defamation. NRS § 42.005(2). The limits on pecuniary damages also do not apply where the injury is caused by an individual who operates a vehicle after consuming alcohol or a controlled substance.  NRS § 42.010.

7. Has your state recently implemented any tort reforms which may affect transportation lawsuits or is your state planning to, and if so, explain the reforms.

There are currently no relevant or applicable court reforms.

8. How many months generally transpire between the filing of a transportation related complaint and a jury trial.

A trial will typically occur between three (3) and five (5) years after the filing of the complaint. Rule 41(e) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court must dismiss an action for want of prosecution if a plaintiff fails to bring the action to trial within five (5) years after the action was filed. The requirements of Rule 41(e) were stayed while restrictions related to Covid-19 were in place.

9. When does pre-judgment interest begin accumulating and at what percent rate of interest.

Interest accrues on a judgment for past damages from the date the complaint was served until satisfied, while any amount representing future damages draws interest from the time of the entry of the judgment until satisfied. NRS § 17.130(2). As such, prejudgment interest will be calculated from the date of service of the plaintiff’s complaint to the date the judgment is satisfied by the defendant. Any future damages awarded to the plaintiff will not begin to accrue interest until after the entry of the judgment. Post-judgment interest accrues as of the date the judgment is entered.  Interest is calculated “at a rate equal to the prime rate at the largest bank in Nevada as ascertained by the commissioner of financial institutions on January 1 or July 1, as the case may be, immediately preceding the date of judgment, plus 2 percent. The rate must be adjusted accordingly on each January 1 and July 1 thereafter until the judgment is satisfied.” See NRS 17.130.

10. What evidence at trial are the parties allowed to enter into evidence concerning medical expense related damages.

In general, evidence regarding the amount charged by medical providers is admissible.  Nevada has adopted a per se collateral source rule that bars “the admission of a collateral source of payment for an injury into evidence for any purpose.” Proctor v. Castelletti, 112 Nev. 88, 90, 911 P.2d 853, 854 (1996). Efforts to introduce amounts actually charged for specific procedures have not been successful if that evidence relies on insurance rates or information that could be considered collateral source. Defendants are permitted to assert that the amounts charged are not reasonable or customary for the community.

There is an exception to Nevada’s collateral source rule which allows the admission of the actual workers’ compensation benefits paid. Tri-County Equip. & Leasing v. Klinke, 128 Nev. 352, 354, 286 P.3d 593, 595 (2012). Nevada law also provides an exception in medical malpractice actions, in which the amount actually paid to a medical provider is admissible. See Tam v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 80, 358 P.3d 234, 241 (2015).

11. Does your state recognize a self-critical analysis or similar privilege that shields internal accident investigations from discovery?

Currently, Nevada does not recognize the self-critical analysis privilege, with the limited exception of medical review committees.  See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.117.

12. Does your state allow independent negligence claims against a motor carrier (i.e., negligent hiring, retention, training) if the motor carrier admits that it is vicariously liable for any fault or liability assigned to the driver?

In Nevada, a plaintiff can hold an employer liable under the theory of respondeat superior when the employee was under the control of the employer and when the act was within the scope of employment. Molino v. Asher, 96 Nev. 814, 817 (1980); Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 1217, 1223 (1996). By admitting a driver was in the “course and scope” of employment, the company is acknowledging that it is liable for any negligence that may be attributable to the driver. Admitting vicarious liability can render moot or duplicative the claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. In Wright v. Watkins and Shepard Trucking, Inc., 968 F.Supp.2d 1092, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, interpreting Nevada law, held that a plaintiff cannot recover under theories of respondeat superior and negligent hiring if the negligent hiring claim would not impose additional liability on the defendant because the company had admitted vicarious liability.

13. Does your jurisdiction have an independent claim for spoliation?  If not, what are the sanctions or repercussions for spoliation?

There is no independent claim for spoliation. There is a pre-litigation duty to preserve relevant evidence. Waters-Maria v. Valley Health Sys., LLC, No. 69455, 2017 WL 4996827, at 1 (Nev. App. Oct. 31, 2017) (citing Bass–Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 449-450, 134 P.3d 103, 108 (2006)). This duty is imposed on each party once the party is on “notice” of a potential legal claim.  Id.  This duty applies to any insurance claims documents and incident reports prepared after an accident.  Statements made to an insurance adjuster are discoverable. If the statement was elicited or an investigation conducted specifically at the direction of an attorney, then work-product or attorney-client privilege may apply. See Ballard v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 106 Nev. 83, 84-85. (Nev. 1990).  All such documents should be preserved to prevent spoliation.

If the evidence was willfully suppressed, it may be presumed to be averse to the party that suppressed the evidence. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.250(3). The burden then shifts to the party who destroyed the evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence destroyed was not unfavorable. Bass-Davis, 122 Nev. at 448. Where the evidence is negligently lost or destroyed, the opposing party can only seek an inference that the evidence would have been averse to the party who negligently lost or destroyed the evidence. Id. at 445.